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001 | 144 | ||
003 | Libertad | ||
005 | 20230831185656.0 | ||
007 | ta | ||
008 | 230724s2014 nju||||g |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
020 | _a978-0-691-15524-1 | ||
040 |
_aLIBERTAD _bspa _cLIBERTAD _dLIBERTAD _erda |
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041 | 0 | _aeng | |
082 | 0 | 4 |
_a332.109 _bC165f |
100 | 1 |
_aCalomiris, Charles W. _d1957- _eautor _9745 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aFragile by design : _bThe political origins of banking crises and scarce credit / _cCharles W. Calomiris y Stephen H. Haber . |
264 | 3 | 1 |
_aNew Jersey : _bPrinceton University Press , _c2014 . |
300 |
_a432 páginas ; _c25 cm. |
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520 | 3 | _aWhy are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. | |
650 | 1 | 4 |
_aQuiebras bancarias _9746 |
650 | 2 | 4 |
_aBancos y banca _9747 |
650 | 2 | 4 |
_aCrédito _9748 |
700 | 1 |
_aHaber, Stephen H. _d1957- _9749 |
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942 |
_2ddc _cLB _n0 |
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999 |
_c144 _d144 |